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This paper explores the differences between executive compensation regimes in 
France, the United States, and China. It asks whether there is a link between 
state regulation of real options as a form of executive compensation and state 
regulation of shareholder protections. This paper argues that if a country 
regulates the use of real options as compensation, then that country is also more 
likely to have strong shareholder protection laws. This argument seems to be 
true based on a descriptive review of executive compensation law and 
shareholder protections in France, the United States, and China. 
If it is true that countries that regulate real options compensation are more 
likely to enact strong shareholders protections, then it is also likely that these 
countries are relying on the Crowding Out Theory. Under the Crowding Out 
Theory, executive compensation is designed to strike a balance between low 
pay, which motivates executives to work harder, and high pay, which 
disincentives executives from pursuing alternative forms of compensation that 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Institutions, specifically legal institutions, exert significant control 
over executive compensation.1 Because the law is a problem-solving tool, 
lawmakers reform executive compensation laws when they believe there is 
a problem with the way their country’s executives are being compensated.2 
However, there is often a lack of consensus among lawmakers on what the 
problem with executive compensation actually is, or how executive 
compensation should be structured to solve the problem.3 These 
disagreements are amplified across countries and cultures, resulting in 
differences in the laws addressing, and even defining, executive 
compensation. 
This paper provides an overview of the differing legal rules for 
executive compensation in France, the United States, and China.4 Prior 
papers studying the differences in executive compensation law across 
countries measured cultural values and highlighted social perceptions of 
compensation.5 This paper instead proposes a link between state regulation 
of real option compensation and state regulation of shareholder protection.6 
 
 1 Laws, litigation procedures, business operating procedures, collective labor 
organizations, and taxes are all examples of institutions. See generally John R. Searle, What 
is an Institution?, 22 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 15-19 (2005). 
 2 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1117-19 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta] (explaining that 
countries can be grouped into “legal families” depending on “(1) historical background and 
development of the legal system, (2) theories and hierarchies of sources of law, (3) the 
working methodology of jurists within the legal systems, (4) the characteristics of legal 
concepts employed by the system, (5) the legal institutions of the system, and (6) the 
divisions of law employed within a system”) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL W. 
GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSKAWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITION: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND 
CASES ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, 
GERMAN, ENGLISH, AND EUROPEAN LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 1994)). 
 3 Payments might be gratuitous or improperly influencing executives’ interests. See 
Johannes M. Pennings, Executive Reward Systems: A Cross-National Comparison, 30 J. 
MGMT. STUDIES 261, 261-62, 265-66 (1993) [hereinafter Pennings] (asking “[W]hat 
interpretive schemas do people in different organizations espouse about performance-reward 
relationships, and do they signal national differences? Do such schemas mirror values 
[power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity] that vary across 
nations?”). 
 4 This paper draws inspiration from cross-cultural studies but focuses primarily on legal 
institutions. The data needed to answer a question about the impact of culture on executive 
compensation does not exist at present, and in a controlled study with three countries there 
would be more control variables than observations. 
 5 Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and 
Corporate Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. AND ECON. 229, 235 (2005) (Table 1A defines the 
Schwartz cultural value dimensions (embeddedness/autonomy, hierarchy/egalitarianism, and 
mastery/harmony). Table 1B defines the Hofstede cultural value dimensions 
(individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
masculinity/femininity)). 
 6 Shareholders need not be private individuals. Rather, they may be government entities 
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The hypothesis is that when a government regulates the use of real options 
as compensation, that government is also more likely to have strong 
shareholder protection laws.7 This hypothesis seems to be true based on a 
descriptive review of compensation law in France, the U.S., and China, but 
a quantitative study should be done with a larger group of countries to reach 
a definitive conclusion. This question is not about the pay-risk or pay-
performance sensitivity of stock options compensation, although those 
issues are relevant. Rather, the goal is to identify whether governments that 
take measures to protect shareholders also limit real option compensation 
for executives.8 If governments are relying on Crowding Out Theory it 
could explain a correlation between the strength of limits on real options as 
a form of executive compensation, an indirect form of shareholder 
protection, and the strength of more direct shareholder protection laws. A 
future qualitative study might consider controlling for the prevalence of 
state shareholders in different regimes, a factor explored in part below. 
In Part III, this paper discusses the wide variety of forms that 
executive compensation can take and explores lawyers’ and economists’ 
theories on the functions that executive compensation may serve depending 
on its structure. This paper primarily relies on the Crowding Out Theory, 
under which executive compensation is designed to strike a balance 
between low pay, which motivates executives to work harder, and high pay, 
which disincentives executives from pursuing alternative forms of 
compensation that would harm shareholders. In Part IV, this paper 
discusses the actual practices and laws used to structure and limit executive 
compensation in France, the U.S., and China. In Part V, this paper explains 
common methods of shareholder protection. In Part VI, this paper provides 
an overview of how shareholders are protected in each of the three 
countries discussed. In Part VII, this paper concludes that, while the 
regulation of executive compensation and the prevalence of shareholder 
protection measures seem to be related, quantitative work needs to be done 
on the topic. 
II. LIMITATIONS 
Comparing specific laws is valuable because these three countries, 
China and France in particular, frequently look to other nations’ laws when 
developing their own, such as when defining fiduciary duties. However, the 
mechanisms that work to address risky compensation under one system do 
not necessarily translate into another, and it is important to understand how 
 
such as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
 7 Options can be stock options or real options. This paper focuses on real options, 
which are all the choices executives make in a business context, such as the flexibility to 
engage in self-dealing, to steal, to not work hard, or to abuse executive perks. 
 8 Ramón Abascal & Francisco Gonzále, Shareholder Protection and Bank Executive 
Compensation After The Global Financial Crisis, 40 J. FIN. STABILITY 15, 34 (2019). 
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the adoption of a single law would actually impact a different economy or 
legal system.9 The strength of executive compensation regulations is also 
not the only cross-country variable, as both state ownership and direct 
shareholder control over pay clearly play a role in the way real option 
compensation manifests. These factors should be given more consideration 
in a future paper. The significantly different legal regimes in each country 
and their distinct economic histories, ranging from heavy state involvement 
to relatively unregulated risk-taking, provide insight into why options might 
be a concern for China, where they have a demonstrated potential for abuse, 
but are far less of a concern for France. Further, the various legal 
enforcement mechanisms, agencies, and international organizations that 
create binding or soft laws either have different goals depending on the 
context or take unique paths to reach the same goal. 
Because this paper only examines a limited part of a low-government 
control regime (U.S.), a mid-control regime (France), and a high-control 
regime (China), a future paper could ask a more specific question about the 
strength and clarity of specific compensation laws in each nation, 
potentially by observing how different countries’ federal income tax laws 
define and treat gifts in the context of compensation.10 Further, a future 
study could compare the length of time different countries’ shareholders 
wait in court to litigate claims under equivalent laws (such as violations of 
fiduciary duties, which vary across countries), how much shareholders 
recover, and how often shareholders win. 
If a future paper asks more specific questions about how laws affect 
companies in one or more of the countries discussed, there might be issues 
with data collection. French and American executives in private companies 
are not required to disclose pay, so this data is not available for comparison, 
and Chinese executives of listed State-Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) 
subsidiary companies do not disclose pay if they are paid by the unlisted 
parent rather than by the listed subsidiary.11 Even if this data were 
available, there is a selection bias among companies that choose not to list, 
which could affect their decisions on executive compensation.12 
 
 9 Shen Wei & Casey G. Watters, Do All Roads Lead to China?: Scholarship of Chinese 
Commercial Law in the Past Decade (Part 1), 16 CHINA REV. 165, 168 (2016) [hereinafter 
Wei] (It is naive to think China can simply adopt, by legal transplants, comprehensive 
commercial law statutes from other jurisdictions and achieve the same results.). 
 10 E.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2010); T.D. 1-655, 97 C.B. 1 (1919)(discussing Revenue 
Act of 1918 § 213); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 718 (1929) 
(“Employer’s payment of income taxes assessed against employee held to constitute 
‘additional taxable income’ to employee, as consideration for services rendered.”). 
 11 Li-Wen Lin, Revisiting Executive Pay of China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Formal 
Design, Fresh Data, and Further Doubts, 19 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 27, 29 (2018) [hereinafter 
Li-Wen Lin]. 
 12 There are many factors other than reporting requirements that influence companies 
not to list their shares on stock exchanges. 
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III. HOW CAN EXECUTIVES BE COMPENSATED? 
While money is the first thing that comes to mind when discussing 
compensation, payment is not always straightforward, and in fact can be 
nearly impossible to quantify or to identify at all.13 Executive compensation 
can, and should, include obvious elements, such as a salary, bonus, stock 
options, stock appreciation rights, a performance share plan, deferred 
compensation, healthcare, or a pension. However, compensation can also 
include less obvious and more questionable elements such as a golden 
parachute, the opportunity to engage in self-dealing, and other privileges 
that vary widely based on external factors such as shareholder protections, 
social norms, and the individual being compensated.14 
After lawmakers have identified the form executive compensation 
tends to take in their country, they must then consider various theories of 
compensation to improve compensation’s function. These theories address 
a range of issues from solving the agency problem, to keeping executives in 
check, to maximizing executive performance, to attracting talent, to 
identifying non-pecuniary incentives. It is not until form and function are 
considered together that lawmakers can address perceived problems with 
their country’s compensation laws. 
a. Forms of Compensation 
All executive compensation fits into one of two categories: it is either 
non-pecuniary compensation or pecuniary compensation.15 Non-pecuniary 
 
 13 If compensation were strictly pecuniary, an attorney with a market value of $190,000 
USD annually would never accept a federal clerkship for $50,000 USD annually. However, 
this choice is not uncommon because of non-pecuniary compensation. In this situation, the 
hypothetical attorney values adding “federal clerkship” to their resume at $140,000 USD, 
whether that value is coming from increased reputation, status, value in the labor market, or 
from personal enjoyment of the experience. 
 14 See TAPOMOY DEB, MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 396 
(1st ed. 2009). See generally ELIZABETH A. ISING ET AL., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SEC’S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE RULES (2016), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/ 
publications/Ising-Mueller-Hanvey-Executive-Compensation-Disclosure-Handbook-
Donnelley-Financial-Solutions-Oct-2016.pdf (discussing salaries, bonuses, stock awards, 
option awards, non-equity incentive plans, pensions, nonqualified deferred compensation, 
plan-based awards, outstanding equity awards, payments upon termination or change in 
control, and golden parachutes); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, 
and How We Got There, HANDBOOK OF ECON. FIN. (2012) (describing various forms of 
executive compensation present during, or prior to, 2012). See also Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (pioneering a theory of ownership structure 
for the firm based on the theories of: (1) agency; (2) property rights; and (3) finance). 
 15 See, e.g., Yannis Georgellis et al., Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Aspects of Self-
Employment Survival, 47 Q. REV. ECON. AND FIN. 94, 106 (2007) (providing an example of 
how pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation work in conjunction). See also Michael C. 
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, 3 J. 
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compensation means non-monetary benefits and is an extremely broad 
category, encompassing economic and social factors such as job 
satisfaction, future career opportunities, and prestige. Pecuniary 
compensation includes the most obvious traditional forms of payment, 
including salary, stock options, and bonuses. Pecuniary compensation can 
be either riskless or risky, and risky compensation exists as either explicit 




Riskless compensation includes salaries and pension plans, which are 
relatively certain.16 Risky compensation can be either explicit compensation 
or real options, both of which are relatively uncertain. 
Explicit compensation includes stock and stock options, whereas real 
options include all strategic business choices, not just financial options.17 
Real options therefore include all choices executives make in a business 
context.18 Ideally, the executive will choose to maximize business 
opportunities and minimize its obligations, but the executive can choose 
illicit real options instead, such as the flexibility to engage in self-dealing, 
to steal, to not work hard, or to abuse executive perks. Financial options are 
a subset of real options, where the executive has a specific right to buy or 
 
Applied Corp. Fin. 36, 45-46 (1990) (discussing problems with pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
incentives). 
 16 See Deb, supra note 14, at 394. 
 17 See Keith J. Leslie & Max P. Michaels, The Real Power of Real Options, 3 THE 
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 5, 6, 10 (1997) (“[A]ll business decisions are real options, in that 
they confer the right but not the obligation to take some initiative in the future.” 
Overlooking real options and considering only explicit compensation would “ignore the 
value of flexibility.”). 
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sell one of the company’s financial assets.19 
b. Functions of Compensation 
The primary goal of compensation is to pay an individual for their 
services because those services cannot be obtained without compensation. 
However, while obtaining services is the most important objective, the 
secondary goals of compensation—aligning directors’ interests with 
shareholders’ interests, attracting talent, and discouraging theft—are still 
extremely relevant.20 The following theories explore the range of goals a 
compensation committee might have when setting executive compensation 
and the compromises the committees might make in pursuit of those goals. 
These theories will be broken down to reflect five major goals: (1) solving 
the agency problem; (2) keeping executives in check; (3) maximizing 
executive performance; (4) attracting talent; and (5) identifying non-
pecuniary incentives. 
Agency Theory, Optimal Contracting Theory, Crowding Out Theory, 
and Risk Adjustment Theory seek to solve the agency problem. Under 
Agency Theory, some incentives align the executive’s interests with 
shareholders’ interests while others push these parties’ interests further 
apart.21 Optimal Contracting Theory optimistically suggests that executive 
compensation is a governance mechanism that resolves agency conflicts 
with shareholders.22 Under Crowding Out Theory, determining executive 
compensation means balancing low-pay, which motivates executives to 
work harder, with high-pay, which disincentivizes executives from pursuing 
alternative forms of compensation that might harm shareholders.23 Under 
Risk Adjustment Theory, executives who hold riskier forms of 
compensation must be compensated with salaries and bonuses that offset 
the risks and incentivize them to take an appropriate amount of risk for the 
company.24 
 
 19 Id. at 12 (“[W]hereas a financial option is acquired and exercised in a deep and 
transparent market, real business situations usually feature a limited number of players 
interacting with one another, each of which can influence the . . . option value.”). 
 20 See Marco Heimann et al., Peoples’ Views About the Acceptability of Executive 
Bonuses and Compensation Policies, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 661, 663–64 (2015)(In the context 
of executive compensation, the dimensions of social justice are: (1) retributive; (2) 
procedural; (3) distributive; and (4) restorative justice). The corresponding renumeration 
strategies are: (1) high renumeration; (2) transparency and fairness in resource allocation; (3) 
the attribution of renumeration; and (4) special bonuses for adversely affected employees.). 
 21 Pennings, supra note 3, at 263-64. 
 22 Lin Lin, Regulating Executive Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 J. 
L. & COM. 207, 210-211 (2014) [hereinafter Lin Lin]; Rim Ben Hassen et al., Executive 
Compensation and Ownership Structure, 31 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 593, 594 (2015). 
 23 Deb, supra note 14, at 381. (explaining that executives might take advantage of real 
options if they do not receive enough pecuniary compensation). 
 24 Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or 
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1179 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas]. 
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Bargaining Power Theory and Board Capture Theory focus on keeping 
executives in check by preventing executives from setting their own 
compensation to the detriment of the company. Under Bargaining Power 
Theory, executives have substantial power in hostile takeovers and can 
bargain for greater compensation, such as accepting a large personal 
payment to relinquish their seat on the board and facilitating friendly deals 
while benefitting themselves.25 Under Board Capture Theory, the 
executives on the boards of public companies who nominate directors are 
rewarded with significant compensation for those nominations and are 
therefore incentivized to keep compensation high.26 
Expectancy Theory, Teamwork Theory, and Tournament Theory seek 
to maximize executive performance. Under Expectancy Theory, effort is 
tied to performance and performance is tied to rewards, which may inspire 
executives to expend greater effort.27 Under Teamwork Theory, unequal 
pay fosters rivalry, so executives are less competitive when their 
compensation is relatively equal.28 Finally, under Tournament Theory, 
winning the highest executive compensation package is seen as a way to 
demonstrate that an executive has outcompeted their peers.29 
Human Capital Theory, Marginal Revenue Product Theory, Efficiency 
Wage Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, and Superstar Theory ask how 
companies can attract and keep talented executives. Under Human Capital 
Theory, the higher an executive’s human capital (skills, connections, and 
experience) the higher that executive’s compensation.30 Under Marginal 
Revenue Product Theory, determining executive compensation means 
weighing the availability of jobs against the availability of executives 
capable of performing the work.31 Similarly, under Efficiency Wage 
Theory, when an executive’s compensation is higher, the executive is less 
likely to leave the company and more likely to work for the company.32 
Under Opportunity Cost Theory, when an executive’s compensation is 
 
 25 Id. at 1178; See generally STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, N.Y.U., EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (Jennifer Carpenter & 
David Yermack eds., 1999) (discussing the conflicted, “interlocking” nature of 
compensation decisions, resulting from the board’s involvement in the process). 
 26 Thomas, supra note 24, at 1176 (arguing that “Marginal Revenue Product Theory, 
Tournament Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, Bargaining Theory, and Risk Adjustment 
Theory-[offer] better explanations for the international CEO pay gap than Board Capture 
Theory”). 
 27 Pennings, supra note 3, at 263 (Expectancy Theory posits individual differences, 
while Agency Theory treats individuals in a standardized fashion.). 
 28 Lin, supra note 11, at 49. 
 29 Deb, supra note 14, at 379-81 (discussing Marginal Revenue Product Theory, Human 
Capital Theory, Efficiency Wage Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, Superstar Theory, 
Tournament Theory, Figurehead Theory, Stewardship Theory, and Crowding Out Theory). 
 30 Id. at 380. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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higher than other executives’ compensation, the less likely that executive is 
to leave the company in search of higher compensation.33 Finally, under 
Superstar Theory, talented executives are compensated disproportionately 
as compared to less talented executives because the talented executives 
cannot be replaced.34 
Figurehead Theory and Stewardship Theory highlight the non-
pecuniary incentives which executives might find attractive. Under 
Figurehead Theory, status gained by becoming a figurehead is a form of 
non-pecuniary executive compensation.35 And under Stewardship Theory, 
executives are similarly compensated by shareholder satisfaction, in part 
because they are shareholders’ “stewards” who are acting in shareholders’ 
best interests.36 
While this is by no means a comprehensive overview of executive 
compensation theory, thinking about the different theories a compensation 
committee or lawmaker might use to structure executive compensation 
provides a framework to think about the benefits and risks compensation 
can present to directors and shareholders. This paper will primarily work 
within Crowding Out Theory, focusing on the idea of regulating real 
options compensation to disincentivize executives from pursuing the types 
of alternative compensation that harm shareholders. If governments are 
relying on Crowding Out Theory, this could explain a correlation between 
the strength of limits on real options as a form of executive compensation, 
an indirect form of shareholder protection, and the strength of more direct 
shareholder protection laws. 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
REGULATION, INSTITUTIONS, & ACTUAL PRACTICES IN 
FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, & CHINA 
Asking how real options are regulated as a form of executive 
compensation in a low-government control regime (U.S.), mid-control 
regime (France), and high-control regime (China) is important because the 
issue of fairness in executive compensation has become increasingly 
contentious since shareholders suffered through the 2008 global financial 
crisis.37 With recent changes in the law, France now has strong executive 
compensation laws, the United States has moderate executive compensation 
laws, and China has comparatively weak executive compensation laws. 
 
 33 See Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 381. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Ramón Abascal & Francisco González, Shareholder Protection and Bank Executive 
Compensation after the Global Financial Crisis, 40 J. FIN. STABILITY 15 (2019) (explaining 
the financial crisis as an “exogenous shock potentially affecting banks’ investment 
opportunities” and focusing on the change in pay-risk sensitivity and risk-taking incentives 
embedded in executive compensation before and after the crisis). 
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For example, France is subject to E.U. laws which regulate executive 
compensation aggressively. One such law is Sapin II, a “Say on Pay” law 
that gives shareholders a binding vote on whether or not executives’ 
salaries should be reduced.38 In the comparatively moderate United States, 
the federal government has increased its focus on “reasonable” 
compensation, of which options are a significant part, but there is a circuit 
split and no clear federal limit. Finally, China faces significant challenges 
when regulating real options because executives exercising those options 
are frequently agents of the state, and the state is overwhelmingly a 
shareholder in public Chinese companies. 
Given the lack of data on compensation and the impossibility of 
evaluating the prevalence or value of non-pecuniary compensation, the goal 
is not to evaluate the true financial impact of laws addressing executive 
compensation.39 The following review of legislative history is instead 
meant to provide background on some of the key executive compensation 
issues that France, the United States, and China have addressed over the last 
century, and to explore the ways that lawmakers in each country perceive 
compensation’s form and function. Further, this overview examines the 
degree to which option compensation seems to be a concern for each 
country’s lawmakers, and evaluates whether the laws in place are achieving 
the desired effect of restricting executives’ use of option compensation 
where lawmakers have decided that it is a problem. 
a. France 
Beginning in the 18th century, the French State was a major owner and 
controlling shareholder in a variety of large companies.40 Because French 
law grants controlling shareholders significant rights, the government was 
able to exercise considerable influence over the economy.41 After France 
opened nationalized companies to private investors in the post-war period 
and created a mixed economy, corporate executives had more flexibility to 
pursue diverse business goals, although the state still had to approve 
directors’ business plans.42 While private ownership has significantly 
 
 38 Irene Bucelli, Glass, Lewis & Co., France’s First Binding “Non” on Say-On-Pay, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/07/frances-first-binding-non-on-say-on-pay/ 
[hereinafter Bucelli]. 
 39 Private American and French companies do not have to report compensation and 
there is inaccurate SASAC data in China. See China Daily, State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council (2020), http://en.sasac.gov.cn. (The 
State Council operates the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(“SASAC”) to track economic performance of Chinese companies.). 
 40 James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 40 (1998) [hereinafter Fanto]; La Porta, supra note 2, at 1118 
(French law is civil law.). 
 41 Fanto, supra note 40, at 40. 
 42 Id. at 41 (“The State often operated a profit-making business for purposes unrelated to 
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increased over the past half-century, state control is not entirely absent from 
French corporate governance, and the concept of state control over 
executives is prevalent.43 
In 1994, the Committee for Banking Regulation recommended that 
French companies publicly disclose information about executive 
compensation.44 By 2001, France heightened restrictions on self-dealing 
transactions and on executive compensation in the form of options. Against 
this background, and in the face of mounting press coverage on executive 
pay, France responded to the 2008 financial crisis by reforming executive 
compensation.45 In the immediate period following the crisis, France 
addressed “golden parachutes.”46 More recently, the French Anticorruption 
Agency enacted Sapin II, which outlined how to manage risk and 
established binding “Say-on-Pay” voting.47 These changes occurred against 
a backdrop of extensive, if somewhat disordered, mandatory disclosures of 
company information to shareholders and variable voting rights.48 
In the early 2000s, France built on existing regulations to prohibit self-
dealing contracts, a form of real options, by board members in high-risk 
transactions.49 While French law addressed self-dealing transactions as 
early as the late nineteenth century, it was not until the early 2000s that 
France set procedures to govern transactions where an officer, director, or 
10% shareholder had an interest, however indirect, in a transaction.50 Now, 
a majority of a French board’s disinterested members must approve the 
transaction, the chairman of the board must obtain a statutory auditor’s 
report, and a majority of disinterested shareholders must also approve the 
 
the specific financial well-being of the firm, such as to address unemployment, distribution 
of credit, and public services.”). 
 43 Id. at 43-44. 
 44 Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Executive Compensation-setting Practices in 
France, 33 LONG RANGE PLAN. 527, 531 (2000). 
 45 PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS POWER: CORPORATE CONTROL 
IN EUROPE AND JAPAN, 173 (2011) (In April 2009, 1.5% of French articles covered executive 
compensation.). 
 46 Geneviève Helleringer, Related Party Transactions in France - A Critical 
Assessment, 4 n.13 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 474, 2019) [hereinafter 
Helleringer]. 
 47 Bucelli, supra note 38; Philippe Bouchez El Ghozi & Morgan A. Heavener, French 
Anticorruption Agency Issues Detailed New Guidelines for Compliance with Sapin II (Apr. 
16, 2018), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=4c43866a-2334-
6428-811c-ff00004cbded [hereinafter Bouchez]. 
 48 Fanto, supra note 40, at 48–51 (A company may grant a shareholder double voting 
rights if he or she holds shares in registered (as opposed to bearer) form for at least two 
years.). 
 49 Helleringer, supra note 46, at 7. Cf. Pennings, supra note 3, at 268 (explaining that 
French executives “are not for sale” and do not require contracts, although French law 
explicitly prohibits executives from forming self-dealing contracts in many cases). 
 50 Helleringer, supra note 46, at 7 n.32. 
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transaction.51 Further, no company is permitted to make loans on behalf of 
an inside director unless that director is a legal person, eliminating the 
opportunity for self-dealing through loans.52 One issue with this law is that 
“indirect interest” is left somewhat undefined in the French statute, 
although board chairs, directors, and CEOs of both listed and unlisted 
companies can be criminally liable for abusing a corporation’s assets.53 
Starting around 2007, France increased government scrutiny of 
“golden parachutes,” a type of pecuniary compensation, by prohibiting 
companies from paying resigning corporate officers any deferred 
compensation that was not conditional on their achievement of performance 
objectives.54 The French Business Confederation’s 2008 Code of Corporate 
Governance (unenforceable soft law) went even further, prohibiting 
“golden parachutes” altogether.55 These real and aspirational changes were 
a step towards tying performance to compensation, but they did not legally 
force companies to tie performance to compensation across the board. 
Although some French executives have taken the radical step of voluntarily 
forgoing receiving bonuses, French law does not completely prohibit 
executives from receiving bonuses unrelated to performance.56 On balance, 
however, executive compensation laws in France are extremely progressive. 
Further, as an E.U. member state, France is subject to E.U. regulations, 
many of which have been catalysts for change in French law. One of the 
E.U.’s first initiatives against excessive executive compensation came on 
July 6, 2010, when the European Parliament adopted the Capital 
Requirements and Bonuses Package (“CRBP”). As part of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (“CRD”), the CRBP initiative affected European 
banks by capping cash bonuses at 30% of the total bonus (and at 20% for 
“large bonuses” as defined by France), requiring that 50% or more of each 
bonus be comprised of contingent capital or shares, and mandating that 
40% or more of each bonus be deferred (60% for “large bonuses” as 
defined by France) for at least three to five years, then reduced based on 
how the executive’s transactions turn out.57 While this law applies only to 
 
 51 Id. at 8-9; CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-38, art. L. 
225-40, para. 2, art. L. 225-40, para. 2-4. 
 52 Helleringer, supra note 46, at 10; COMMERCIAL CODE art. L. 225-43. 
 53 Helleringer, supra note 46, at 8, 12 (summarizing COMMERCIAL CODE art. L. 242-6). 
 54 See Georges A. Cavalier, On French Interventions in the Financial Crisis, 35 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 785, 792 (2010) (noting that the 2007 TEPA Law in Favor of Labor, Employment 
and Purchasing Power “ensure[s] that ‘golden parachutes’ are not a ‘reward for failure’”) 
[hereinafter Cavalier]. See generally Hervé Touraine & Olivier Bernard, Structured finance 
and securitisation in France: overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (2016), 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-501-
0172?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true]. 
 55 Cavalier, supra note 54, at 792-93. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Oxford Analytica, E.U. Adopts New Executive Pay Standards, (Jul. 12, 2010, 6:00 
AM) https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/09/eu-executive-pay-business-oxford-analytica.html. 
Crowding Out Theory 
41:89 (2020) 
103 
E.U. banks, E.U. operations of foreign banks and institutions, and third-
country subsidiaries of E.U. banks, it represents a strong critique of 
executive pay unrelated to performance across all industries in the E.U.58 
In 2013, the CRD introduced “Say on Pay” voting through soft law, 
which France formally adopted through national legislation.59 Later, the 
May 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive (“SRD”) recommended that 
shareholders review executive compensation on a long-term basis, a 
measure which France has also adopted.60 The European Council began 
planning the law in 2013, inspired by Switzerland’s then-new initiative to 
empower shareholders.61 While E.U. member states interpret the directive 
according to their national systems of law, a core part of SRD is providing 
shareholders with information about executive compensation so 
shareholders can more effectively regulate executive pay.62 
In 2018, France set out a six-step method under Sapin II to prevent 
risks related to corruption, which fall under the options category of 
executive compensation.63 Companies with over 500 employees and annual 
revenues in excess of 100 million euros must identify how risk will be 
mapped, identify corruption risks “inherent” in the company’s activities, 
evaluate the company’s exposure to the identified risks, assess whether 
current risk management methods are sufficient, address outstanding risks, 
and regularly update the risk map.64 Unlike the French Business 
Confederation’s unenforceable soft-law measures against “golden 
parachutes,” the Sapin II guidelines hold more legal weight.65 While the 
guidelines published by the AFA (the regulatory body created by Sapin II) 
are non-binding, they are strong indicators of what the French Public 
Prosecutor will prosecute, and the AFA can sanction qualifying companies 
that violate the guidelines.66 Also in 2018, France established “Say on Pay” 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338. 
 60 See Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term 
Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1. 
 61 John O’Donnell & Sinead Cruise, Europe Moves Towards Swiss-Style Executive Pay 
Curbs, (Mar. 6, 2013, 8:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-pay/europe-moves-
towards-swiss-style-executive-pay-curbs-idUSBRE9250WM20130306. 
 62 BROADRIDGE, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE: ADVANCING TO A STATE OF 
READINESS 4 (2017); Directive 2017/828/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards The Encouragement of Long-
Term Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 2. 
 63 Bouchez, supra note 47. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Law No. 2016-1691 on Transparency, Fighting Corruption and Modernizing 
Economic Life. This law is binding. 
 66 George A. Stamboulidis, Susrut A. Carpenter & Sophie Rouach, Two Years Since 
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voting under Sapin II.67 This drastic measure against executive 
compensation reflects the goals of the E.U. 2017 SRD.68 While a soft-law 
version of “Say on Pay” has been a part of French law since 2013, listed 
companies now face binding ex-ante and ex-post votes on executive 
compensation.69 
b. United States 
The United States regulates executive compensation through both state 
and federal laws.70 In the 1970s, a shift in executive pay towards perks and 
options inspired the SEC to expand disclosure requirements surrounding 
executive compensation.71 This development contributed to the issue of 
“unreasonable” compensation, although different federal circuits have dealt 
with the problem in different ways.72 
More recently, the U.S. federal government has heightened disclosure 
regulations after excessive use of options contributed to the 2008 financial 
 
Sapin II: Is France Now a Player in the Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement Arena?, 
BAKERHOSTETLER (June 24, 2019), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/two-years-since-sapin-
ii-is-france-now-a-player-in-the-global-anti-corruption-enforcement-arena (The AFA cannot 
investigate or prosecute criminal offenses and cannot settle with target companies through 
the CJIP process. It can only refer Sapin II violations to the French Public Prosecutor, the 
Parquet National Financier.). 
 67 Id.; Alain Pietrancosta, Say on Pay: The New French Legal Regime in Light of the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive II, 3 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER [R.T.D.F.] 
105, 107 (2017) [hereinafter Pietrancosta]. 
 68 Pietrancosta, supra note 67, at 106-08 (explaining that remuneration policy must 
“contribute to the company’s business strategy and long-term interests and sustainability and 
shall explain how it does so” and “explain how the pay and employment conditions of 
employees of the company were taken into account when establishing the remuneration 
policy” (Art. 9(a)(6))). 
 69 Id. at 107; Bucelli, supra note 38 (explaining that an ex-post vote addresses 
remuneration for the former CEO for fiscal year 2018, while an ex-ante vote addresses 
proposed remuneration for the current CEO for fiscal year 2019). 
 70 See generally Sarah H. Burghart, Overcompensating Much? The Impact of 
Preemption on Emerging Federal and State Efforts to Limit Executive Compensation, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 669 (2009) (analyzing a selection of state and federal laws that 
control executive compensation). 
 71 KEVIN J. MURPHY, THE POLITICS OF PAY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 4-5 (2011). Item 402 of the Securities Act regulating executive 
compensation was implemented in 2006. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2020), LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/229.402. See generally Robert E. Scully 
Jr., Executive Compensation, the Business Judgment Rule, and the Dodd-Frank Act: Back to 
the Future for Private Litigation?, 36 FED. LAW. (2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/df-
title-ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-58.pdf. 
 72 Sean Morrison & Andy Howlett, A Big Return to Reasonable Compensation, 163 Tax 
Notes Fed. 1957, 1960-61 (2019) [hereinafter Morrison] (explaining the modern American 
reasonableness standard); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. (“The Congress shall have Power to 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”). 
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crisis. Similarly, state courts—and Delaware’s courts in particular—have a 
robust body of law used to protect shareholders when executives breach 
their fiduciary duties by engaging in conflicted transactions.73 At present, 
federal securities law applies to reporting companies and mandates 
disclosure, federal tax law applies to all companies and deals with questions 
of reasonableness, and Delaware General Common Law applies to 
companies incorporated in Delaware and enforces both the fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty. 
Since the late 1940s, U.S. federal courts have been asked how much 
compensation is reasonable, with different circuits coming to extremely 
different conclusions about which factors should be used or whether factors 
should be used at all.74 Among courts that use factor tests, there is a general 
consensus that an employee’s role within a company, the compensation 
received by similarly-situated employees, the “character and condition” of 
the company, conflicts of interest, and the consistency of compensation 
within the company are all relevant.75 Among courts that use independent 
investor tests, the question is “after compensation is paid to shareholder-
employees, [does] the remaining profit in the business provide[] a rate of 
return on equity that would satisfy an independent investor[?]”.76 
At the state level, the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) 
outlines directors’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and provides that 
executive compensation cannot be a “waste of assets.”77 Under the duty of 
loyalty, executives have a responsibility not to engage in conflicted or “self-
dealing” transactions, such as setting their own pay, because they cannot 
complete this task while remaining fully loyal to their shareholders.78 To 
 
 73 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768-81 (2015); DELAWARE 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, Annual Report Statistics (2018). https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ 
(Fortune 500 corporations overwhelmingly chose Delaware as their state of incorporation in 
2018.). 
 74 Morrison, supra note 72, at 1960-61. 
 75 Id. at 1962-66. 
 76 Id. at 1966. See IRC § 199A Qualified Business Income. 
 77 See Robert A. Kutcher, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, in BUS. TORTS LITIG., 3, 3 (2d ed. 
2005) (“(1) Did a fiduciary relationship exist at the time of the alleged misconduct? (2) If so, 
what was the scope of the relationship? (3) Was there a breach of the duties that arose within 
the scope of the relationship?”). See generally 7B AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FORMS CORPS. § 143 
Complaint, petition or declaration—Allegation—Breach of fiduciary duty—Waste of 
corporate assets (2019) (“The fiduciary duty imposed on the directors of a corporation 
includes a duty not to waste corporate assets. When a transaction is not approved by a 
disinterested board of directors, and there is no shareholder ratification of the transaction, the 
court must employ its own judgment in determining whether the evidence shows that the 
directors used the utmost good faith and the most scrupulous fairness in approving the 
transaction.”). 
 78 E.g. Espinoza v. Zuckerberg, 124 A.3d 47, 54 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“Where directors 
make decisions about their own compensation, those decisions presumptively will be 
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avoid a conflicted transaction, which would trigger use of the entire fairness 
standard of review should shareholders litigate, Delaware companies often 
use compensation consultants.79 Counterintuitively, the introduction of 
compensation consultants has actually raised compensation by incentivizing 
consultants to set high compensation packages so companies will continue 
to use their services.80 
There are no legal caps on executive compensation in any of these 
federal or state laws, and shareholder votes on executive compensation are 
only advisory.81 Further, regardless of the legislative measures implemented 
to address excessive risk and unreasonable compensation, American 
shareholders are at a disadvantage when litigating violations of federal or 
state law. Due to the way American corporate lawsuits are structured, 
shareholders’ money will be used to fund the board’s defense attorneys and 
may even be used to pay settlements if insurance, indemnity, and personal 
liability are not applicable. 
c. China 
Between 1949 and 1978, China had a centrally planned economy and a 
socialist public ownership system.82 Under this arrangement, managers 
received a government-determined salary free from equity incentives.83 
Over the past half-century, however, the Chinese Communist Party 
 
reviewed as self-dealing transactions under the entire fairness standard rather than under the 
business judgment rule.”); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(“[I]nformed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which 
corporate directors have a material conflict of interest . . . [protects] the transaction from 
judicial review except on the basis of waste.”); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 
(Del. 1979) (“The essence of a claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion 
of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes.”). 
 79 Martin J. Conyon, Executive Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay (Chief 
Executive Officer), 64 VAND. L. REV. 397 (2011) (discussing the role of executive 
compensation consultants in setting CEO pay). 
 80 Id. at 406-07 (As of 2011, the five leading consultants advise 70% of all firms in the 
S&P 1500, and over 75% of the constituents of the S&P 500.). 
 81 E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21. See generally Steven N. Kaplan, Executive 
Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges, 
CHI. BOOTH PAPER NO. 12-42 (2012) (explaining and challenging the American belief that: 
(1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their 
performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance); Joseph E. 
Bachelder III, Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(Sept. 17, 2011) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/17/say-on-pay-under-dodd-frank/ 
(Dodd-Frank Section 951 is not intended to change the fiduciary rules applicable to officers 
and directors of public corporations, but a negative say-on-pay vote may be taken into 
account as evidence of failure of officers and directors to meet their fiduciary 
responsibilities.). 
 82 Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 213. 
 83 Id. at 214; Qiang Cheng, Terry D. Warfield, Equity Incentives and Earnings 
Management, 80 ACCT. REV. 441 (2005) (Equity incentives arise from stock-based 
compensation and stock ownership.). 
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(“CCP”) has gradually privatized both State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) 
and businesses, decentralized the government, introduced equity incentives 
as a form of executive compensation, and separated property ownership 
rights from property control rights. These legal changes led to the 
prevalence of options as a form of executive compensation in SOEs, 
heightening executives’ incentives to engage in collusion–activity that 
benefits agents and supervisors at shareholders’ expense.84 China’s 
government has responded to this trend by regulating both the transfer of 
property rights and the presence of equity incentives in SOEs and private 
businesses and by articulating fiduciary duties, but China has yet to draft 
legislation limiting options as a form of executive compensation.85 
After the “property rights reform” movement led to privatization and 
granted SOEs greater property control rights, China’s government 
decentralized, giving local officials the ability to promote their 
subordinates. This change provided officials non-pecuniary compensation 
in the form of bargaining power over their subordinates’ careers.86 During 
this period, the government-determined salary that had prevailed for the 
prior three decades was loosened to allow for variation in executive 
bonuses, further exacerbating the issue of bargaining power, as executive 
positions became increasingly lucrative.87 
In 1984, the CCP introduced equity incentives to the Chinese economy 
for the first time when the SOE Beijing Tianqiao Department Store 
Company became a private company limited by shares.88 While the use of 
equity incentives is somewhat restricted (Chinese firms can repurchase only 
a limited number of shares issued in public offerings to give to their 
employees as equity incentives), the use of equity incentives was still a 
 
 84 MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S CRONY CAPITALISM 25, 29 (2016) (explaining the social 
structures that facilitate collusion, or “crony capitalism,” in China) [hereinafter Pei]. 
 85 Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 207-08 (“[T]he primary role of Chinese law in regulating 
executive compensation should . . . be to improve the regulatory structure for setting 
executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way.”); see also Legal Research Guide: 
China, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/china.php 
(last updated Dec. 8, 2016)(China has a civil legal system). 
 86 Pei, supra note 84, at 35; Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 53, 59 (“The personnel 
linkages across the government and the SOEs also suggest that the hybrid identity of SOE 
managers – as business managers and government officials (perhaps more of the latter) – has 
significant impact on incentives. The main incentive of Chinese government officials is 
political career advancement rather than formal financial remuneration. Political promotions 
permit greater power to develop corrupt patronage networks, through which SOE executives 
may engage in systematic looting to amass tremendous personal wealth.”). 
 87 Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 214-15 (By 1988, state-appointed managers could earn up 
to 300% more than their average employee, while state-appointed operators could earn up to 
500% more.); Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 59 (China has moved towards a dual-pay 
system, wherein SOE executives coming from the state system are paid less than SOE 
executives coming from outside the state system, who receive a market rate. However, 
important state positions are closed to these non-state employees.). 
 88 Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 215. 
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notable endorsement of riskier forms of pecuniary compensation.89 Later, 
China introduced liability insurance to incentivize executives to take more 
risks, and by 2004 stock incentive plans were formally introduced.90 
In 1986, the Land Administration Law (“Land Law”) officially 
separated property ownership rights from property control rights, creating a 
market for land use without requiring the state to relinquish ownership over 
the land.91 In 1987 and 1988, administrators formalized procedures 
governing, and fees associated with, the sale and transfer of property 
control rights. Further regulations followed in 1990 and 1994.92 
Significantly, the officials who had gained bargaining power over their 
subordinates in the second legal shift now gained power over wealthy 
investors as well, because investors were better able to bribe officials to 
gain control of land they might not otherwise be able to access.93 Relatedly, 
the directors of Chinese corporate boards have less power than directors of 
American or French boards because of China’s concern that executives 
managing state assets in SOEs might make decisions that fit business goals 
rather than national goals.94 Instead, Chinese shareholders exercise power at 
the general assembly meeting. 
In 2003, the CCP addressed executives’ heightened incentives to 
engage in the real option of collusion by founding the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(“SASAC”), which “give[s] the impetus to [SOEs] . . . to realize 
coordinated and sustainable development of enterprises, society and 
environment in all respects.”95 Further, in 2006, Company Law introduced 
the fiduciary duties of diligence and loyalty.96 Company Law was quickly 
followed by the CRSC Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed 
 
 89 Id. at 225. 
 90 Fidy Xiangxing Hong, Director Regulation in China: The Sinonization Process, 19 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 501, 522 (2011) [hereinafter Hong]. 
 91 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the People’s Republic of China, June 25, 
1986, rev’d Dec. 29, 1988, rev’d Aug. 29, 1998, rev’d Aug. 28, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 1999) 
available at http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/laws/envir_elatedlaws/200710/ 
t20071009_109921.shtml; Pei, supra note 84, at 30, 51, 53 (In China, land use rights can be 
sold without transferring legal ownership of the land.). 
 92 Pei, supra note 84, at 51-52. 
 93 Id. at 31-33, 35. 
 94 Hong, supra note 90, at 513. 
 95 STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
COUNCIL, GUIDELINES TO THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES DIRECTLY UNDER THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT (Nov. 2, 2019, 9:58 PM), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2011/12/06/c_313.htm; Lin 
Lin, supra note 22, at 217 (Executive pay increased by 247% between 2001 and 2011.). 
 96 Company Law (promulgated by the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 29, 1993, rev’d 
Dec. 25, 1999, rev’d Aug. 28, 2004, rev’d Oct. 27, 2005, rev’d Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar. 
1, 2014) arts. 147-49, available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html; 
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 238; Wei, supra note 9, at 172 (The doctrine of good faith takes 
on a “unique Chinese flavor,” as U.S. courts apply the doctrine in a comparatively limited 
way.). 
Crowding Out Theory 
41:89 (2020) 
109 
Companies, which defined the fiduciary duty of diligence, although neither 
Company Law nor the CRSC Guidelines explain what a director’s duties 
are when setting executive compensation, and directors cannot set their own 
compensation.97 In terms of administrative oversight, supervisors in China’s 
two-tier board system (a board of directors operates under a supervisory 
board, and a CEO can be the chairman of that board) lack the power to 
make decisions, and instead check for violations of Company Law or the 
Articles of Association.98 
While Chinese directors can be held criminally liable for bribery, 
embezzlement, and misappropriation, the statutory duties of diligence and 
loyalty are not enforceable laws.99 This is significant because China has a 
civil law system rather than a common law system, and its courts cannot 
establish laws on their own or interpret laws that have not been enacted by 
statute.100 Further, it is not clear what compensation China’s executives are 
actually receiving. As of 2015, SASAC sets the base salary for all SOE 
executives at the same level, including salary, bonuses, pension, health 
insurance, and housing subsidies, while bonuses and subsidies are 
variable.101 However, the compensation disclosed by SASAC may not fully 
account for a significant component of executive compensation: one study 
found that executives’ on-duty consumption was between two to fifty times 
greater than their annual compensation.102 
V. HOW CAN SHAREHOLDERS BE PROTECTED? 
While setting executive compensation involves asking how to 
incentivize executives to act properly, setting shareholder protections 
involves asking how to prevent executives from acting against 
 
 97 GUIDELINES FOR ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF LISTED COMPANIES (2016 REVISION), 
CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201804/P02018042733197
4952658.pdf; Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 233-34, 238-39 (citing Xia Jijun & Zhang Yan, The 
Conflicts Between Control Rights and Incentives: An Empirical Analysis on the Effect of 
Stock Incentives in China, 3 ECON. RES. J. 87, 97 (2008) (The link between executive pay 
and performance is weaker when executives are more powerful, and incentives are less 
impactful when shareholders have more control because SOE shareholders are 
overwhelmingly state organizations who will re-appoint government executives.)). 
 98 Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 218, 234, 239 (citing P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 
47(9); P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 71; P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts. 
38(2) & 47(9)). 
 99 Hong, supra note 90, at 507. 
 100 Id. at 509; Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 239. 
 101 Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 33, 45-48, 56 (2018) (SASAC transplants Western pay-
for-performance but preserves socialist pay equality.). 
 102 Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 226 n. 97 (summarizing the findings of a study of 1,320 
Chinese listed companies by Yang Rong, Research on Executive Compensation of Listed 
Companies of Monopolistic Industries—Based on Perquisite Consumption, 5 FUDAN J. 
(SOCIAL SCIENCES ED.) 133 (2011)). See also Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 38. 
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shareholders’ best interests and how to empower shareholders to protect 
themselves. Instead of balancing incentives to determine what regulations 
are appropriate, which is done with executive compensation, this inquiry 
instead defines shareholders’ rights, interests, and reasonable expectations, 
and enumerates executives’ legal duties. Shareholder rights are generally 
enumerated under state and federal law and in a company’s charter, 
although in some contexts companies can create shareholder rights 
agreements which require shareholders to relinquish legal protections. 
Further, shareholders in private companies enjoy fewer protections than 
shareholders in public companies because most countries impose stricter 
standards on public companies (those that are listed on national stock 
exchanges and can more easily reach a greater number of potential 
investors and shareholders). 
Shareholders can come in many different forms. Some are private 
citizens owning a small amount of stock, others are activist hedge funds 
purchasing controlling blocs, and others are governments, such as France 
and China. While the presence of a state owner may flip the power dynamic 
and put the executives in a disadvantaged position compared to the state 
shareholders, this is not a situation that shareholder protections are meant to 
address. Further, because shareholders’ identities vary, some shareholders 
are more vulnerable than others and can be harmed by other, more powerful 
shareholders, particularly those with a control bloc. 
Regardless of their relative strength, all types of shareholders tend to 
rely both on preventative measures (to discourage controlling shareholders, 
directors, and officers from abusing minority shareholders), and also on 
remedial measures (to permit shareholders to sue the companies, directors, 
and officers if their rights are violated or to retroactively vote to reduce 
pay) for protection. However, each country defines shareholder rights 
differently and places an emphasis on a different method of shareholder 
protection (e.g. while France explicitly gives minority shareholders more 
voting power against executives, the United States provides many 
opportunities for shareholders to pursue legal action). 
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN 
FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, & CHINA 
As we have seen, France has strong executive compensation laws, the 
U.S. has moderate executive compensation laws, and China has 
comparatively weak executive compensation laws. If the hypothesis is 
correct, then France will have strong shareholder protection laws, the U.S. 
will have moderate shareholder protection laws, and China will have 
comparatively weak shareholder protection laws. 
a. France 
Like American shareholders, most French shareholders have the right 
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to vote in general meetings, to access information, to bring direct or 
derivative lawsuits, and to receive dividend payments, all of which can be 
modified and limited by a shareholder agreement.103 Similarly, French 
shareholders also cast precatory (rather than binding) votes, and boards 
must have a high minimum number of independent directors.104 
However, France has expanded shareholder rights beyond those 
granted in the United States, giving shareholders in limited liability 
companies (société à responsabilité limitée (“SARL”)) and shareholders in 
stock companies (société en commandite par actions (“SCA”), and société 
anonyme) the rights to legally demand answers to questions at general 
meetings and to challenge board resolutions, even if the challenger is only a 
minority shareholder.105 The amount of stock an individual holds is also 
less important under the French default rules than under Delaware’s default 
rules or U.S. federal law, as each French SARL shareholder, regardless of 
his or her stock interest, can request that a representative convene a general 
meeting.106 
b. United States 
As with executive compensation law, both state and federal laws 
govern U.S. shareholder protection law. Because American corporations 
overwhelmingly incorporate in Delaware, and because shareholders’ rights 
are established in a company’s certificate of incorporation, the DGCL 
dominates legal debates over U.S. shareholder rights.107 Notably, American 
shareholders can give up rights beyond those in a company’s charter 
through a contract known as a stockholders’ agreement or shareholders’ 
agreement (“SA”).108 
In general, however, American shareholders operating under 
Delaware’s default rules enjoy one vote per share and vote to delegate the 
authority to manage the corporation to a board of directors, all of whom are 
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reelected after a one-year period and have a fiduciary duty to maximize 
shareholder wealth.109 Shareholders have the ability to sue in either a direct 
or derivative lawsuit when directors fail to uphold this fiduciary duty, but 
American shareholders largely shoulder the burden of legal expenses. 
c. China 
China did not establish a stock market until the end of the 20th century, 
therefore China’s shareholder protections laws are less than three decades 
old.110 While the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China was issued in 2001, a 2003 corporate governance report identified 
problems with the Shanghai stock exchange. Two issues the report brought 
to light were the lack of protections for minority shareholders and the 
relative strength of majority shareholders (i.e. state owners) in Chinese 
listed companies.111 Since the early 2000s, China has promulgated laws 
establishing a duty of good faith for controlling shareholders and 
emphasizing shareholders’ right to bring group actions for damages caused 
by directors’ and senior officials’ illegal acts.112 When the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) reviewed these and 
related changes in 2011, the OECD expressed a generally favorable view of 
the reforms. However, the OECD flagged “curbing abusive related party 
transactions, enhancing the quality of boards, improving shareholder 
protection[,] and curbing market abuse” as areas needing improvement.113 
Similarly, research institutions have not come to a consensus regarding the 
effectiveness of China’s shareholder protection laws.114 This discrepancy is 
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partially due to the fact that China’s corporate and financial laws develop 
quickly, while China’s explicit oppression remedies and plaintiff-friendly 
civil procedure rules develop slowly.115 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper explored the hypothesis that when a government regulates 
the use of real options as compensation, that government is also more likely 
to have strong shareholder protection laws. This descriptive review of 
executive compensation laws in France, the United States, and China is 
consistent with the idea that illicit options are less prevalent where 
shareholder protections are stronger. Therefore, this paper concludes that 
the hypothesis is correct. If governments are relying on Crowding Out 
Theory, this could explain the correlation. 
This paper recommends that all countries should consider 
implementing legislation requiring executive compensation committees to 
review shareholder protections and to use them as a starting point when 
setting executive compensation. By placing a greater emphasis on the 
relationship between shareholder rights and executive interests, meaning 
that shareholders’ actual ability to protect themselves would receive 
primacy in compensation negotiations, compensation committees could 
make more holistic decisions that pick up the slack wherever shareholder 
protections are failing. Compensation negotiations would therefore rely on 
a modified version of the Crowding Out Theory (under which executive 
compensation should strike a balance between low pay, which motivates 
executives to work harder, and high pay, which dissuades executives from 
pursuing alternative forms of compensation that would harm shareholders) 
whereby the specific harms shareholders could experience under the charter 
and shareholder agreement would be reviewed in depth. This would create a 
direct connection between executive compensation and shareholder rights 
because, in practice, these two issues are deeply interrelated. 
Although neither this measure nor any other would prevent corruption 
and abuse, it would strengthen minority shareholders’ position within a 
company, effectively giving shareholders a seat in executive compensation 
discussions. Further, controlling shareholders would not have their interests 
unduly advanced in this type of negotiation system, as the goal would be to 
protect the shareholders who are easiest to abuse by analyzing which rights 
are left unprotected or are being given up through shareholder agreements. 
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